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ABSTRACT: The essay focuses on the different mechanisms of marriage downgrading. Given the 
principle of “cross-border continuity” of statuses, limits to this continuity are sometimes admitted and 
they are placed through downgrading mechanisms. That can occour in the case of same-sex marriages 
transcription in a Member State which does not allow such marriages, but which does allow same-
sex registered partnerships. Downgrading mechanism has an anti-elusive function, but it is not without 
problems in terms of discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. A different approach is taken in 
the case of an opposite-sex couple requesting the downgrading of their marriage, celebrated before the 
Member State allowed access to registered partnerships for all sex couples. The element of voluntariness 
seems to be the prerequisite for a proper anti-discrimination rule.
KEY WORDS: Family; cross-border couple; marriage; registered partnership; downgrading; 
discrimination.
RESUMEN: El ensayo se centra en los diferentes mecanismos de degradación del matrimonio. Dado el principio 
de “continuidad transfronteriza” de los estatutos, en ocasiones se admiten límites a esta continuidad y se colocan 
mediante mecanismos de degradación. Eso puede ocurrir en el caso de la transcripción de matrimonios entre 
personas del mismo sexo en un Estado miembro que no permite tales matrimonios, pero que sí permite las 
uniones registradas entre personas del mismo sexo. El mecanismo de degradación tiene una función anti-elusiva, 
pero no está exento de problemas en términos de discriminación por motivos de orientación sexual. Se adopta 
un enfoque diferente en el caso de una pareja del sexo opuesto que solicita la degradación de su matrimonio, 
celebrado antes de que el Estado miembro permitiera el acceso a las uniones registradas para todas las parejas 
sexuales. El elemento de la voluntariedad parece ser el requisito previo para una regla adecuada contra la 
discriminación.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Familia; pareja transfronteriza; matrimonio; uniones registradas; degradación; 
discriminación.
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I. “CROSS-BORDER CONTINUITY” OF STATUSES.
The protection of the “cross-border continuity” of statuses acquired abroad 
is a matter concerning, inter alia, the protection of human rights1. Two decisions 
of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on adoption are significant in 
this regard: Wagner and JMWL v. Luxembourg2 and Negrepontis-Giannisis v. Greece3. 
From these decisions we derive the principle that the non-recognition of status 
constitutes a violation of the right to family life when the status corresponds to a 
family bond actually existing in social reality. On the other hand, similar references 
to the prevalence of an established social reality can be found – albeit limited to 
relations between EU Member States – in the case law of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU) on the right to a name. The following cases are 
significant in this regard: Garcia Avello4 (C-148/02) and Grunkin-Paul5 (C-353/06). In 
both the decisions, the CJEU expressed its view on the necessity to harmonize 
national legislation with the needs of free movement and residence of EU citizens 
on the EU territory.
1 Franzina, P.: “Some Remarks on the Relevance of Article 8 of the ECHR to the Recognition of Family 
Status Judicially Created Abroad”, Diritti umani e diritto internazionale, 2011, vol. 5, p. 614 f.: “from the 
standpoint of Article 8 of the ECHR, the shift towards «transnationality» in public policy is not just a 
cultural	option,	or	a	strategy	that	States	are	free	to	decide	whether	to	implement,	or	not:	it	rather	reflects	
the increasingly complex perspective from which private international law issues must be dealt with in 
Europe, i.e. a perspective where the point of view of the forum is no longer a merely «national» one, but 
embodies that State’s international undertakings concerning, inter alia, the protection of human rights”.
2 Wagner and J.M.W.L. v. Luxembourg, No. 76240/01, ECHR 2007-I, with note by kinsCh P.: Note (1-2) sous 
l’arrêt de la CourEDH de 28 juin 2007, Wagner c. Luxembourg, Revue critique de droit international privé, 2007, 
vol. 96, no. 4, pp. 815-822 and d’avout, L.: Note, Journal du Droit International-Clunet, 2008, no. 1, p. 187 ff.
3 Negrepontis-Giannisis v. Greece, No. 56759/08, ECHR 2011-1, with note by kinsCh P.: La non-conformité du 
jugement étranger à l’ordre public international mise au diapason de la Convention européenne des droits de 
l’homme, in Revue critique de droit international privé, 2011, vol. 100, no. 4, pp. 817-823 and dionisi-PeYrusse, 
a.: “Convention européenne des droits de l’homme (articles 8, 14, 6 et article 1er du protocole n° 1)”, 
Journal du Droit International-Clunet, 2012, no. 1, p. 215.
4 CJEU, Case C-148/02, Carlos Garcia Avello v Belgian State, [2003] ECR I-11613.
5 CJEU, Case C-353/06, Grunkin & Paul, [2008] EUECJ C353/06.
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Furthermore the Advocate General in the case Dafeki6, on the free movement 
of workers and probative value to certificates of civil status, recognises that 
the protection of “cross-border continuity,” deeply rooted in the idea itself of 
integration pursued by the European legal order, imposes the “immutability of 
status whenever [...] it constitutes an element of or prerequisite for a right of the 
individual”7.
However, the need to take account of the requirements of protection of 
fundamental human rights and of European integration does not automatically 
give rise to an absolute obligation to recognise legal situations established abroad. 
In fact, on the basis of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) itself, a margin of appreciation is ensured to the State8. It is worth 
highlighting that, since the rights guaranteed by Article 8 of the ECHR correspond 
to those guaranteed by Article 7 EU Charter, according to Article 52 EU Charter, 
the latter must be interpreted to be consistent with the former. 
This assessment of the Member State may, of course, go so far as to sanction 
abuse of the right. In the case Sayn-Wittgenstein (C-208/09)9 the CJEU supported 
the Member State from refusing to recognize all the elements of the surname of a 
national of that State, as determined in another Member State at the time of her 
adoption as an adult by a national of that other Member State. The reasons for 
the refusal are that the surname includes a title of nobility which is not permitted 
in the first Member State under its constitutional law. A different decision by the 
CJEU would probably have favoured conduct in breach of the law. The CJEU’s 
decision is therefore clear in its determination not to give effect to anti-elusive 
conduct carried out in a transnational context. However, it should also be noted 
that, in the latter case, it would have been quite difficult to identify a violation 
of fundamental human rights in the non-recognition of a family name obtained 
through the adult adoption for the sole purpose of bearing a title of nobility and 
achieving social prestige.
6 CJEU, Case C-336/94, Eftalia Dafeki v Landesversicherungsanstalt Württemberg, [1997] ECR I-6761, Opinion 
of Advocate General La Pergola delivered on 3 December 1996, ECLI:EU:C:1996:462. 
7 Ibid., § 6.
8 It should also be borne in mind, at the actual level of the regulation on the circulation and cross-
border recognition of public documents, the possibility of overlapping plans: over the broader aim of 
international harmonisation, which is precisely that of the Commission Internationale de l’État Civil, tends 
to prevail the intra-European integration expressed in the “Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on promoting the free movement of citizens and businesses by simplifying 
the acceptance of certain public documents in the European Union and amending Regulation (EU) No. 
1024/2012.”{COM(2013)	228	final}{SWD(2013)	145	final}.	
9 CJEU, Case C-208/09, Sayn-Wittgenstein, [2010] EUECJ C-208/09. The case refers to an Austrian national, 
adopted by a German national with a title in his surname Fürst von Sayn-Wittgenstein (Prince of Sayn-
Wittgenstein) and that thereby acquired the same surname. The entry of such surname was refused by 
Austrian courts due to the prohibition of titles of nobility, which is considered to be part of Austrian public 
policy.
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The provision of cross-border continuity of subjective statuses therefore 
presupposes an assessment by the receiving Member State of their recognisability 
and the concrete possibility of attributing legal effects to them, which cannot derive 
from the mere capacity of those statuses to produce effects in the State of origin. 
It is thus possible to impose limits on the “cross-border continuity” of status, which 
can ensure the compatibility of the status with a given legal framework. 
Differences being made, the CJEU rule of reason applied in the Cassis de Dijon 
decision10 for goods also applies to the status11: national restrictive measures are 
permitted in the absence of common rules, provided that they pursue an objective 
of general interest which may override the principle of free movement.
II. DOWNGRADING MECHANISMS IN FAMILY LAW.
Domestic restrictive measures can be imposed by using adapted recognition 
mechanisms. These mechanisms mostly have an impact of a status-limiting 
character, and tend to take the form of downgrading.
A Council Decision of 2001 provides a definition of downgrading as 
follows: “The term ‘downgrading’ (déclassement) means a reduction in the level 
of classification”12. Applying this general scheme13 in the context of private 
international law, it is possible to set up a downgraded recognition. This involves 
implementing a redevelopment technique whereby a situation created abroad can 
be recognised in a given State, after the same situation has been reconverted into 
one corresponding to that envisaged by the State itself.
Downgrading finds application in various areas of family law. In the cases 
(highlighted in the previous paragraph) of adoption and family name, and in other 
similar ones, namely the refusal to recognise foreign birth certificates stemming 
from international surrogacy arrangements14. The most frequent application, 
however, concerns marriage and, consequently, registered partnerships. 
10 CJEU, Case C-120/78, Rewe-Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon), [1979] ECR 649.
11 BorGmann-PreBil, Y.: “The Rule of Reason in European Citizenship”, European Law Journal, 2008, vol. 14, no. 
3, p. 349: “the rule of reason approach coined in Cassis remains the principal paradigm of Community free 
movement law.”
12 Council of the European Union, “Council Decision adopting the Council’s security regulations”, Brussels, 
28 February 2001, 5775/01, Section II, p. 18.
13 A similar notion of downgrading can also be encountered in non-European contexts, e.g. in the United 
States.	Cf.	the	definition	in	the	Electronic	Code	of	Federal	Regulations,	49	CFR	§	8.5:	“Downgrading	means	
a	 determination	 by	 a	 declassification	 authority	 that	 information	 classified	 and	 safeguarded	 at	 a	 specific	
level	shall	be	classified	and	safeguarded	at	a	 lower	 level.”	The	text	 is	available	at	www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/
text/49/8.5 (last visited: 4 July 2021).
14 Several refusals to recognise cross-border surrogacy arrangements and the various consequences entailed 
have been challenged before the ECtHR on the grounds of the violation of the child’s right to respect for 
private and family life (article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights). Cf. Mennesson v. France, 
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The downgrading of marriage to registered partnership leads to a sort of 
redefinition of the legal protection reserved to same-sex couples. The ECtHR 
does not seem to consider that the loss of the nomen iuris “marriage” in itself could 
determine an illegitimate interference with the right to family life15. 
In the case Orlandi and others v. Italy16, the ECtHR states that the institution of 
registered partnership offers same-sex couples the possibility of achieving a legal 
status equal or similar to marriage in many respects. The assimilability of the two 
legal forms therefore leads the Court to hold that the possibility of transcribing 
and recognising same-sex marriage as a registered partnership is, in principle, a 
sufficient condition for meeting the standard of protection offered by the ECHR.
As a precedent for this approach, reference may also be made to the case 
Hämäläinen17, which concerned the “forced” conversion of a marriage into a 
registered partnership, following the gender reassignment of one of the spouses. 
The case is clearly characterised by two peculiarities, which in themselves place it 
at the margin of the downgrading theme we are addressing. It has no cross-border 
dimension and concerns the issue of a change of sex with respect to a marriage 
already celebrated. However, the case is interesting because, in its decision, the 
ECtHR does not find a violation of the ECHR in the downgrading of a marriage 
into a registered partnership. According to the Court, in fact, a different formal 
union, which preserves the same rights and duties as marriage, achieves a fair 
balance of two competing interests18: the person’s right to have his or her sexual 
identity recognised – even in the event of change of sex – and “the State’s interest 
to maintain the traditional institution of marriage intact”19.
The mentioned Orlandi case also provides an interesting insight that we cannot 
avoid considering. Of the six applicant couples, three were married in Canada, a 
fourth in California and the remaining two in the Netherlands. Only three of the 
six couples were in the State of celebration of the marriage for work purposes, 
whereas the others, even at the time of the celebration, were permanently 
resident in Italy. 
No. 65192/11, ECHR 2014-III; Labassée v. France, No. 65941/11, ECHR 2014-V; Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy 
[GC], No. 25358/12, ECHR 2017.
15 sCaFFidi runChella, L.: “Il riconoscimento e la trascrizione dei matrimoni same-sex conclusi all’estero alla 
luce delle recenti decisioni del Tribunale di Perugia e della Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo nel caso 
Orlandi ed altri c. Italia”, GenIUS, 2018, vol. 1, p. 147.
16 Orlandi and others v.Italy, Nos. 26431/12; 26742/12; 44057/12 and 60088/12, ECHR 2017. Cf. a comment 
to the decision in deana, F.: Diritto alla vita familiare e riconoscimento del matrimonio same-sex in Italia: note 
critiche alla sentenza Orlandi e altri contro Italia (Right to Family Life and Same-Sex Marriage Registration in Italy: 
The ECtHR Decision in Orlandi and Others v. Italy), Rivista di Diritti Comparati, 2019, num. 1, pp. 153-183.
17 Hämäläinen v. Finland [GC], No.37359/09, ECHR 2014-IV.
18 salzBerG,	D.A.G.:	“Confirming	 (the	 illusion	of)	heterosexual	marriage:	Hamalainen	v	Finland”,	 Journal of 
International and Comparative Law, 2015, vol. 2, num. 1, p. 176.
19 Hämäläinen v. Finland [GC], cit., § 38.
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With regard to these last three couples, therefore, it seems likely that they 
moved abroad with the intention of eluding the Italian law that prohibited them 
from getting married20.
This anti-elusive mechanism operated at the time of celebration of the six 
marriages in a legal system – the Italian one – which did not offer yet same-
sex couples any form of recognition, leaving them in a legal vacuum. When the 
ECtHR’s decision passed, in 2017, Italy already had adopted the model of registered 
partnerships for same-sex couples. But a different form of anti-elusive mechanism 
– the downgrading of marriage to registered partnership – is still effective in the 
State, as it is based on domestic legislative provisions and is confirmed by case-law 
of the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation.
III. MARRIAGE DOWNGRADING AS AN ANTI-ELUSIVE MEASURE.
In its decision of 21th July 2015, case Oliari and Others v. Italy21, the Strasbourg 
Court condemned Italy for the failure of the legislature, despite numerous 
reminders from its superior courts22, to provide for a legal institution distinct from 
marriage that would recognise a relationship between persons of the same sex, 
since the lack of legal recognition of such unions resulted in a violation of the right 
to respect for private and family life as set out in Article 8 of the Convention.
In light of this condemnation by the Strasbourg Court, Italy thereafter passed 
Law No. 76 of 20 May 2016, which entered into force on 5th June 2016, and the 
subsequent implementing decrees (Legislative Decrees No. 5, 6 and 7 of 19th 
January 2017).
The law, which is the result of a troubled parliamentary process, was drafted 
using a regulatory technique that is unusual in civil law systems: that of a single 
article composed of several (precisely: 69) paragraphs.
20 sCaFFidi runChella, L.: “Il riconoscimento”, cit., p. 140, sub note 40.
21 Oliari and Others v. Italy, No. 18766/11 and 36030/11, ECHR 2015. Cf. the following comments to the decision: 
lenti, L.: “Prime note a margine del caso Oliari c. Italia”, Nuova Giurisprudenza Civile Commentata, II, 2015, 
pp. 575-581 and Winkler, m.m.: “Il	piombo	e	l’oro:	riflessioni	sul	caso	Oliari c. Italia”, GenIUS, 2016, no. 2, 
pp. 46-61. For further details, see also: venuti, M.C.: “La regolamentazione delle unioni civili tra persone 
dello stesso sesso e delle convivenze in Italia”, Politica del diritto, 2016, vol. 47, p. 95 ff. and Winkler, M.M.: 
“Same-Sex Marriage and Italian Exceptionalism”, Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law, 2018, vol. 
12, pp. 433-456.
22 Corte Cost., 15th April 2010 No. 138, in Giurisprudenza Costituzionale, 2010, no. 2, pp. 1604-1628, with 
note by romBoli, R.: Il diritto “consentito” al matrimonio ed il diritto “garantito” alla vita familiare per le coppie 
omosessuali in una pronuncia in cui la Corte dice “troppo” o “troppo poco”, in the same review, pp. 1629-1642 
and Cass. civ., sez. III, 15th March 2012 no. 4184, in Famiglia e diritto, 2012, no. 7, pp. 665-691, with note by 
Gattuso, M.: “Matrimonio”, “Famiglia” e orientamento sessuale: la Cassazione recepisce la “doppia svolta” della 
Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo.
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Paragraph 1 defines a registered partnership (“unione civile”) between persons 
of the same sex as a specific social formation pursuant to Articles 2 and 3 of the 
Italian Constitution. It thus includes this social formation among those protected 
by the State, because it is the “place” where the personalities of the individuals, 
who are part of it, take place. The explicit reference to social formations makes it 
possible to create a legal link between the constitutional protection of the person’s 
fundamental rights and personal freedom23. 
However, regulating registered partnerships as social formations and not as 
a family is a controversial solution24, as it excludes the possibility of referring to a 
plural concept of a (matrimonial) family, extended to the point of including same-
sex couples25.
In spite of this dogmatic approach, there are similarities between marriage and 
registered partnership. In fact, previous marriage is an impediment to a registered 
partnership (cumulation of marriage and registered partnership is not allowed) 
and the conversion of a marriage into a registered partnership is foreseen if one 
spouse changes his or her sex. In addition, the last name of the “united” partners 
is common, and there is provision for extending any reference to “spouses” to the 
case of “united partners” (if only for the effectiveness of protection). The “united” 
partners are conferred the typical rights and duties of spouses and, lastly, the need 
for the joint determination of the life in common is established.
On the other hand, there is no obligation of fidelity, which is present in 
marriage, and no right to adopt the child of one of the “united” partners, a right 
recognised in marriage.
The notable omission26 of fidelity in registered partnerships is the matter of 
reflection in legal doctrine27. Although fidelity in (heterosexual) marriage is to be 
seen in relation to the presumption of paternity, which cannot be expected in the 
23 On constitutional protection and private autonomy: cf. PaCe, A.: Problematica delle libertà costituzionali. Parte 
generale, Padova, 2003, p. 20.
24	 It	does	not	seem	to	be	the	competence	of	the	ordinary	legislator	to	define	the	constitutional	classification	
of the issued norm. Cf. de CristoFaro: “Le «unioni civili» fra coppie del medesimo sesso. Note critiche 
sulla disciplina contenuta nei commi 1°-34° dell’art. 1 della l. 20 maggio 2016, n. 76, integrata dal D.lgs. 19 
gennaio 2017, n. 5”, in Le nuove leggi civili commentate, 2017, no. 1, p. 118: “non può né deve essere attribuita 
soverchia importanza alla statuizione del comma 1°, che definisce in termini di (mera) formazione sociale la coppia 
del medesimo sesso che abbia costituito una unione civile. Non è infatti certamente compito del legislatore ordinario 
individuare la corretta qualificazione di una fattispecie ai fini del suo inquadramento in questa o quella disposizione 
della Costituzione”.
25 sCaFFidi runChella, L.: “Il riconoscimento”, cit., p. 143.
26 sesta, M.: “La disciplina dell’unione civile tra tutela dei diritti della persona e creazione di un nuovo modello 
familiare”, Diritto e Famiglia, 2016, vol. 10, p. 886: “con riferimento ai rapporti personali tra le parti dell’unione 
civile, resta la vistosa omissione dell’obbligo reciproco di fedeltà” (emphasis added).
27 Fidelity was included in the original text of the draft law, but was deleted by a subsequent – and controversial 
– amendment. Cf. Ferrando, G.: Diritto di famiglia. Unioni civili e convivenze. Aggiornamento 2016, Torino, 
2016, p. 7. 
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case of homosexual unions, nonetheless there seems to be a determination on the 
part of the Italian legislature not to give relevance to sexual relations in (same-sex) 
registered partnerships. If so, such a determination should, however, be supposed 
in relation to outdated moral judgments28. This certainly cannot be disregarded in 
the case of a “forced” downgrading of a same-sex marriage (celebrated abroad) 
into a registered partnership under Italian law.
Among the aforementioned implementing decrees of the law establishing 
registered partnerships, Legislative Decree no. 7 of 19th January 2017, at Article 
1, amends Law no. 218 of 31th May 1995. In particular, it inserts in that law a 
new article, Article 32 bis, that provides that marriage contracted abroad by 
Italian citizens with a person of the same sex produces the effects of a registered 
partnership regulated by Italian law29.
The text of Article 32 bis is not clear: marriages celebrated between two 
Italians are certainly included in its provision, and marriages between two 
foreigners are reasonably excluded30. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether 
the rule is applicable to marriages celebrated between an Italian national and a 
non-national.  The interpretation according to which, for the application of the 
Italian law on registered partnerships, the Italian nationality of one of the spouses 
is sufficient seems to be preferred31.
The ratio legis of Article 32 bis is clearly identifiable. It is attributable to the 
intention to prevent Italian nationals, who in their own State are not allowed 
to contract a marriage with a person of the same sex (but only to enter into 
a registered partnership) from celebrating a marriage abroad and subsequently 
obtaining recognition of it in Italy. On the absolute presumption of a fraude à la loi, 
Italian law is made applicable to these marriages. A forced downgrading of marriage 
in registered partnerships is thus actuated32. In this way, a significant deminutio is 
28 sesta, M.: “La disciplina dell’unione civile”, cit., p. 886.
29 Legislative Decree of 19th January 2017 no. 7, G.U. 27th January 2017 (Amendments and re-ordering of the 
norms of private international law for the regulation of civil unions, pursuant to Article 1(28)(b) of Law 
no. 76 of 20th May 2016): “Art.	1,	Modifiche	alla	legge	31	maggio	1995,	n.	218:	1.	Alla	legge	31	maggio	1995,	
n.	218,	sono	apportate	le	seguenti	modificazioni:	a)	dopo	l’articolo	32	sono	inseriti	i	seguenti	articoli:	Art.	
32-bis. (Matrimonio contratto all’estero da cittadini italiani dello stesso sesso). - 1. Il matrimonio contratto 
all’estero da cittadini italiani con persona dello stesso sesso produce gli effetti dell’unione civile regolata 
dalla legge italiana”.
30 Same-sex marriages concluded abroad by non-Italians, even if recognised as such, will be transcribed in 
Italy	in	the	specific	partnerships	register,	in	the	part	reserved	for	registered	partenerships	celebrated	in	a	
foreign country, pursuant to Article 134-bis of Law No. 218 of 31 May 1995 (amended by Legislative Decree 
no. 7 of 19th January 2017). Cf. sCaFFidi runChella, L.: “Il riconoscimento”, cit., p. 142.
31 BiaGioni, G.: “Unioni same-sex e diritto internazionale privato: il nuovo quadro normativo dopo il d.lgs. n. 
7/2017”, Rivista di diritto internazionale, 2017, no. 2, p. 498.
32 Boele-Woelki, K.: “The Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships Within the European Union”, Tulane 
Law Review, 2008, vol. 82, no. 5, p. 1967 ff.: “This means that the foreign institution is recognized as the 
national institution of the jurisdiction where recognition is sought. This can either lead to an upgrade or 
a downgrade depending on (1) which institution is to be recognized and (2) where the institution is to be 
recognized. This leads to entirely different results. In those countries where a domestic form of registered 
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realised with respect to the institution of marriage, not only in order to the nomen 
iuris in itself – which in the case of marriage certainly has greater evocative force 
and recognised social impact – but also with concern to the relational sphere, with 
the exclusion of the obligation of mutual fidelity. In addition, other exclusions and 
limitations are provided, first and foremost that relating to adoption.
The Italian Supreme Court of Cassation – with Judgment no. 11696 of 14th May 
2018 – ruled on the issue of the recognition of same-sex marriages celebrated 
abroad33. The Court operates by way of interpretation with respect to Law no. 76 
of 20th May 2016 and the implementing decrees. It admits that the text of Article 
32 bis, inserted by means of the implementing decrees, leaves unresolved a specific 
aspect: the question relating to the transcription in Italy of marriages contracted 
abroad between persons of the same sex, in case one of them is an Italian national 
and the other a non-national. However, it seems clear to the Court that Art. 32 bis 
expresses a legislative choice in favour of the registered partnership model, in so 
far as it is a provision aimed precisely at regulating the circulation and recognition 
of the effects of marriage acts celebrated by same-sex couples abroad.
The downgrading of marriage is considered appropriate by the Court34, which 
does not perceive the fumus of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, 
since – as established by the European Court of Human Rights in 2015 in the 
case Oliari et al. v. Italy –35, same-sex partners must be guaranteed the right to 
private and family life, pursuant to Article 8 ECHR, without it being possible to 
impose on the single State the adoption, in a specific way, of marriage instead of 
registered partnership. It is however significant that, referring to the conversion of 
marriage into a registered partnership, the Supreme Court of Cassation uses the 
English expression “downgrading”36 twice in its Judgment, drafted in Italian. This 
expression manifests – as noted above – in an objective manner a “demotion”. 
The clear awareness of the fact that it is allowed a “forced-lowering” of the 
union – legally constituted in the form of a marriage in another State – between 
two persons on the ground of their sex, characterises the Court’s decision in a 
particular way.
partnership has been created, same-sex marriages celebrated abroad are often afforded recognition as the 
domestic form of registered partnership”.
33 Cass. civ., sez. I, 14 May 2018 No. 11696, in Familia, 2019, num. 5, pp. 473-511, with note by ramusChi, M.: 
Sul matrimonio celebrato all’estero tra un cittadino italiano e uno straniero del medesimo sesso.
34 Cf. tonolo, S.: “La tutela internazionale del diritto fondamentale alle relazioni interpersonali e 
l’introduzione nell’ordinamento italiano degli istituti delle unioni civili”, in aa.vv.: Diritto, economia e 
società. In ricordo di Luisa Cusina, Trieste, 2018, p. 255.
35 Oliari and Others v. Italy, cit.
36 Cf. Cass. civ., sez. I, 14th May 2018 No. 11696, cit. The use is noticeable in the decision, at § 9.1 (“L’applicazione 
del cd. downgrading (ovvero l’applicazione della disciplina normativa delle unioni civili)”) and § 13.2 (“l’applicazione 
del cd. downgrading ovvero la conversione della loro unione matrimoniale in unione civile”).
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IV. MARRIAGE DOWNGRADING AS AN ANTI-DISCRIMINATORY CLAIM.
It is easy to perceive that a forced downgrading of marriage into a registered 
partnership represents, for those who suffer it, a sort of “demotion” of their 
formally constituted relationship. This may also have implications on a social level, 
since the denomination “marriage” implies full, agreed acceptance of the bond. 
On the other hand, if the downgrading is not the result of a legal imposition, 
but constitutes an option, albeit temporary, offered to the married parties, the 
perspective changes completely. The parties can freely exercise a right relating 
to the qualification of the legally established bond and they can do that on the 
basis of equal treatment, without distinction with regard to their sex (or sexual 
orientation). The most significant hypothesis is related to a different scenario from 
the one laid out in the previous paragraph, as the downgrading does not concern 
same-sex marriages, but opposite-sex marriages. 
The condition is that the possibility of entering into a registered partnership 
was not available to heterosexual couples at the time of their marriage and was 
subsequently allowed. This can only be the case when a State, as has frequently 
occurred, has offered registered partnership (reserved for same-sex couples) 
as the first form of recognition for same-sex couples. In subsequently admitting 
same-sex couples to marriage, some states have prohibited the formation of new 
registered partnerships (allowing already registered partnerships to upgrade their 
union to marriage). Others have simply allowed same-sex couples to choose 
between entering into a marriage or a registered partnership. This has led to a 
discriminatory situation to the detriment of heterosexual couples, which has only 
been remedied by extending to them the possibility of entering into a registered 
partnership. 
The case in point specifically concerns the United Kingdom. Despite the fact 
that due to the Brexit vote this State, as of 31th January 2020, is no longer a member 
of the European Union37, it offers a very interesting scenario that could potentially 
occur also in other Member States in the future. It should furthermore be borne 
in mind that three different legal systems coexist in the United Kingdom. This 
makes the reconstitution rather complex. Until 2019, the situation was as follows: 
opposite-sex and same-sex couples in England and Wales and in Scotland were 
allowed to marry without any distinction; in Northern Ireland, only heterosexual 
couples were allowed to marry, whereas all same-sex couples were admitted to 
37 daGilYte E.: “The Promised Land of Milk and Honey? From EU Citizens to Third-Country Nationals after 
Brexit”, in s. mantu, P. minderhoud and e. Guild (ed.): EU Citizenship and Free Movement Rights, Leiden, 
2020, pp. 351-352. On the effects of Brexit on family law, from a transnational perspective, cf. ruGGeri, 
L.: “Brexit and new European framework in family property regimes’, in 6th SWS International Scientific 
Conference on Social Sciences. Conference Proceedings, 2019, pp. 59-64.
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register their union; opposite-sex couples were not allowed to register their union 
in the whole United Kingdom38.
In 2014, while the “Equal Civil Partnerships” movement was growing in the 
Country, Rebecca Steinfeld and Charles Keidan, de facto heterosexual cohabitants, 
took legal action, claiming discrimination in the Civil Partnership Act of 2004, 
which did not allow same-sex couples access to registered partnerships39. Their 
reasons were not recognised at first instance and on appeal40, but in 2018 the 
Supreme Court found that there was a clear difference in treatment to the 
detriment of opposite-sex couples41. According to the Court, at the same time as 
the enactment of the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act of 2013 (which allowed 
same-sex couples to enter marriage), the Civil Partnership Act of 2004 should 
have been repealed or provided for to be extended to opposite-sex couples42. 
In fact, sections 1 and 3 of the Civil Partnership Act 2004, which do not allow a 
heterosexual couple to register their union, are incompatible with section 4 of the 
Human Rights Act 1998. The Court also notes a clear conflict between this Act 
and Article 8, in conjunction with Article 14, of the ECHR.
Although the Supreme Court could not repeal the law, it recognised the 
discrimination taking place and made a strong recommendation for the Government 
of England and Wales to reform registered partnerships43. In response to this 
solicitation, the Government launched a legislative initiative that ended on 16 
March 2019, with the enactment of the Civil Partnerships, Marriages and Deaths 
(Registration etc) Act.
On 13th January 2020, in Northern Ireland, the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) 
and Civil Partnership (Opposite Sex Couples) (Northern Ireland) Regulations 
2019 came into force. The 2019 Regulations allow same-sex marriage and at the 
same time, applying the reasoning of the English Supreme Court ruling, amend 
the Civil Partnership Act 2004 and also allow heterosexual couples to enter into 
38 Garetto, R.: “Opposite-sex registered partnerships and recognition issues”, in kramBerGer Škerl, J., 
ruGGeri, l. and viterBo, F.G. (eds): Case Studies and Best Practices Analysis to Enhance EU Family and Succession 
Law. Working Paper, Camerino, 2019, pp. 89-90.
39 Garetto, R.: “Civil Partnerships: the EU Framework for Cross-Border Couples and the Recent Legislative 
Reform in the UK”, in 6th SWS International Scientific Conference on Social Sciences. Conference Proceedings, 
2019, p. 66 f.
40 haYWard, A.: “Relationships between adults: Marriage, Civil Partnerships, and Cohabitation”, in lamont, R. 
(ed.): Family Law, Oxford, 2018, p. 50 f.
41 R (on the application of Steinfeld and Keidan) v Secretary of State for International Development, [2018] UKSC 
32, no. 3: “same sex couples have a choice. They can decide to have a civil partnership or to marry. That 
choice was not - and is not - available to heterosexual couples”.
42 Ibid., no. 48.
43 haYWard, A.: “Equal Civil Partnerships, Discrimination and the Indulgence of Time: R (on the application 
of Steinfeld and Keidan) v Secretary of State for International Development”, Modern Law Review, 2019, vol. 
82, p. 925.
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registered partnerships44. On 23th June 2020 the Scottish Parliament enacted the 
Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2020, that enables persons of different sexes to 
be in a civil partnership. It received royal assent on 28th July 2020, entered into 
force on 30th June 2021, and now awaits further secondary legislation from the 
Scottish Parliament. 
The most interesting situation, however, occurred in Northern Ireland. On 
7th December 2020 the Marriage and Civil Partnership (Northern Ireland) (no. 
2) Regulations 2020 came into force. They provide a conversion mechanism. The 
Regulations indeed allow for a three-year period in which couples in a same-
sex civil partnership formed in Northern Ireland may upgrade to a marriage, and 
couples in an opposite-sex marriage formed in Northern Ireland may downgrade 
to a civil partnership. As explicitly stated by the UK Government, the possibility 
of conversion introduced by the Regoulations “aims to be fair to both same-sex 
and opposite-sex couples in Northern Ireland who have historically not had access 
to certain legal relationships”45. In this sense it can be considered an adequate 
response to anti-discriminatory claims. In any case the Regulations provide that all 
conversion rights will then be brought to an end after three years.
Conversion right for married opposite-sex couples is provided only in Northern 
Ireland at the moment, due to a very recent legislation. 
In Scotland secondary legislation still needs to be progressed, and this issue 
is not yet settled. A possibility similar to that of Northern Ireland is currently 
under consideration in England and Wales. In July 2019 – a few months after the 
enactment of the Civil Partnerships, Marriages and Deaths (Registration etc) Act 
– the Government Equalities Office (GEO) published a paper and consultation 
“Implementing Opposite-Sex Civil Partnerships: Next Steps, Implementing 
Opposite-Sex Civil Partnerships: Next Steps”46. It sought views on proposals to 
introduce the right for opposite-sex couples to convert from a marriage to a civil 
partnership for a limited period of time. 
V. CONCLUSION.
It may be said that there is – in specific situations – a transversality between 
marriage and registered partnership. The conversion from one form to the other 
may take place by choice of the parties or by legal obligation. 
44 mCCormiCk, C. and steWart, T.: “The Legalisation of Same-Sex Marriage in Northern Ireland”, Northern 
Ireland Legal Quarterly, 2020, vol. 71, no. 4, p. 565. 
45 hm Government, Marriage and Civil Partnership - Conversion entitlements in Northern Ireland. UK Government 
consultation response, 22 October 2020, p. 3. 
46 Government eQualities oFFiCe (Geo), Implementing Opposite-Sex Civil Partnerships: Next Steps, July 2019. 
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The first hypothesis is certainly very interesting. It occurs after a Member 
State has intervened in its own regulations on marriage, allowing access to this 
institution for same-sex couples, who previously only had access to registered 
partnerships (expressly reserved for them). This sequencing of the development 
is not a general rule, of course, since there are Member States (e.g. Spain) that 
have introduced same-sex marriage without going through the previous step of 
registered partnership. But in case gradual legislative interventions are provided, 
couples who had previously entered into a registered partnership are very often 
given the possibility of upgrading their union to the status of “marriage.” This is 
particularly the case when, at the same time as same-sex couples have gained 
access to marriage, they have no longer been allowed concluding registered 
partnerships47.
It may occur that a Member State has maintained, on the contrary, the institute 
of registered partnership for same-sex couples and has subsequently extended it 
to heterosexual couples. It is possible for that State to allow heterosexual couples 
to downgrade their marriage to a registered partnership. So far it is only the 
case of Northern Ireland, analysed in the previous paragraph, where opposite-sex 
couples were given the possibility of opting for downgrading. 
Such transversality, if it allows the parties to freely exercise an option, seems 
desirable. Even in case the upgrading from a registered partnership to a marriage or 
the downgrading from a marriage to a registered partnership have consequences 
with regard to the reciprocal obligations of the parties or the rules governing the 
dissolution of the bond, the conversion of the union does not seem to pose any 
particular problems, in case the parties are aware and free in their determination. 
Specific attention must be paid, if anything, to the possibility of a weaker and more 
vulnerable party. In fact, a downgrading from marriage to registered partnership 
could cause damage to this party. The formal expression of the will to convert 
the union, on par with the requirement of formality at the time of its constitution, 
should in any case be considered sufficient. 
The hypothesis in which the downgrading from marriage to registered 
partnership operates ope legis is quite different. In this instance, there are 
possibilities of discriminatory treatment. In the Italian case examined, the Supreme 
Court of Cassation found no violation of the principle of equality (enshrined in 
Article 3 of the Italian Constitution) and found no conflict with Articles 8 and 
47 Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland and Sweden prohibited the establishment of new registered 
partnerships, but the ones previously established are still valid, if the parties did not opt to convert them 
into marriage. Cf. Garetto R.: “Taxonomic variety of registered partnerships in the European Union”, in 
Cazorla GonzÁlez, v., GioBBi, m., kramBerGer Škerl, J., ruGGeri, l. and Winkler, s. (ed.): Property Relations 
of Cross-Border Couples in the European Union, Napoli, 2020, p. 88. 
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14 of the ECHR48. We can maybe disregard the “suspicion” that cross-border 
couples married abroad who request the transcription of their marriage in Italy 
could be treated differently according to the composition of the couple itself (in 
other words: according to the sex and the sexual orientation of the parties). But it 
is objective that there is a disparity of treatment among (cross-border) same-sex 
couples themselves, depending on whether one of the parties is an Itlian national 
or not. In case the parties request the transcription of their marriage in Italy, if 
one of them is an Italian national, they suffer the downgrading of their marriage 
into a registered partnership. In case both the parties are not Italian nationals, 
their marriage is not formally downgraded (but it is transcribed in the register of 
partnerships and not in the register of marriages). It should also not be overlooked 
that in Italy the rules governing marriage and registered partnerships diverge, as 
already emphasised, on several points. A “forced” downgrading may thus have 
“worsening” consequences on the regulation of the relationship.
The conversion of the union by imposition of law does not therefore appear 
to be a desirable solution. On the contrary, leaving it up to the autonomy of the 
parties to decide whether to convert their union from marriage to registered 
partnership (or vice versa, from registered partnership to marriage, as occurs in 
many Member States since years) seems consistent with the right to respect for 
one’s private and family life enshrined in Article 8 ECHR.
48 Cf. Cass. civ., sez. I, 14th May 2018 no. 11696, cit., at § 9.1. 
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